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ABSTRACT

This study examines the use of sensemaking and power/influence in the governance
process of an emerging corporation. It emphasizes the use of the interpretive paradigm
in examining the ways in which reaUty is socially constructed by a board of directors.
This text explores the definition of governance at the emerging corporation from the
inside. It examines the effects of board decisions on the corporation by focusing on a
specific emerging corporation—here fictiously identified as "Softalk Corporation"—in a
major American city. Through this case the author examines how situations were
officially defined, and, how these official definitions translated into real operating
arrangements over twelve months.
The ethnogr^hic study makes the following assumptions ( I ) Symbols are not
only expressive medium, but also a medium for substantive action; (2) Symbols are a
medium for both sensemaking and power/influence; (3) Symbolic processes associated
with the instigation of change involve evolutionary shifts in directionality; (4)
Symbolic processes simultaneously occur at multiple levels of understanding; and (5)
Symbolic non-action can be important to change initiation.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODÜCnON
Corporations are peculiar social creations. They are legal constructs through which raw
materials, capital, labor, and innovation can be brought together to design, manufacture
and distribute goods and services. Their existence is not limited in time or space, and
as independent legal entities, t h ^ are distinct from any of the individuals who
participate in them. They can own property and employ individuals. They can confer a
great power on the individuals who control them.
Corporations are organized and run by an entrepreneur or a management team
that raises funds to acquire physical coital and to finance initial operations by
borrowing from banks or other lenders (debt) or by issuing and selling "equity" shares.
In exchange for the equity funds, the corporation gives investors securities ("stock")
that are claims on a proportionate share of the net proceeds of any activity undertaken
by the corporation, after all obhgations to labor, management, vendors, and other
creditors have been paid.
Since Adam Smith published The Wealth o f Nations in 1776, political
economists have argued that the workings of a free market would keep business
corporations and the individuals that control them from abusing their power and would
promote the most efficient use of the resources they control. If businesses operated
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inefficiently or produced shoddy products they would soon be out of business. Market
pressure was to be the fundamental mechanism in a free market society preventing
corporations from abusing their power. Whether this mechanism works well in any
given case or at all has been the central question in pubUc policy debates about the
regulation of corporations over the last century. Are market pressures strong enough
to prevent corporations from oppressing workers? Can market pressures compel
organizations to be environmentally safe? Can market pressures prevent corporations
from issuing fraudulent securities?
When business people assert that a free market economy will lead to the
efficient use of society's resources for total wealth creation, they are making two large
sets of assumptions. The first is that the sort of questions just mentioned can be
satisfactorily solved. These are what those in the field of economics refer to as
"extemahties" and "transactions costs" (Daft 1992).
A second set of assumptions, and one which is not well studied or understood,
involves the internal functioning of the organizations through which this economic
activity is conducted. This text is about one aspect of this second set of assumptions.
Market pressures are less immediately relevant to the internal functioning of
organizations, because the central issues here have to do with the interactions that take
place within the firm itself. These issues include who among the various participants
in the corporate enterprise model controls what, who makes what decisions, and who
has what responsibilities to whom in the enterprise. Corporate governance is about
setting up rules for these things in business corporations (Williamson 1985).
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The expression "corporate governance" is most often ^plied to questions about
the structure and functioning of boards of directors or the rights and prerogatives of
shareholders in boardroom decisionm aking. Corporate governance is a fascinating
sociological subject, for it has to do with power and accountabihty—who exercises
power, on bdialf of whom, and how the exercise of power is manifested. It involves
complex webs of personal as well as institutional relationships. It provides the
"interested observer" with insights into human frailties and strengths at the same time
as it confronts the student of organizational theory with conundrums. Governing
mechanisms are, after all, the steering devices for complex organizations—with the
potential to guide them down the right or wrong paths (Williamson 1985).
Much has been written in the daily press concerning the governance of major
pubUcally traded corporations, in part as a result of increased shareholder activism and
in part due to the sizable employee layoffs resulting from "downsizing" and/or
"rightsizing" of many large U. S. corporations, such as AT&T. In particular, unions,
community leaders, and certain institutional shareholders have demanded that boards
pay more attention to their concerns, open themselves ip to ideas from the outside,
and even change their structures and habitual forms of operating (see Daft 1992).
Quietly, curiosity about how corporate governance operates in smaller or
privately and closely held corporations has also begun to grow. "Curiosity" is the right
word in that governance is seen by many as a kind of black box that it is hard for
outsiders to penetrate. Moreover, even many of those most intimately involved with
small and emerging corporations have only a dim sense of where power resides, how it
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is distributed and exercised, and how it is limited and controlled.
When adopted as a plan for the organization of wealth, legal instruments, such
as corporations, also serve as models of social organization that come to have
important consequences for processes within the social units to which they ^ p ly .
However, the effect of laws tends to be subtle and cumulative, since legal matters
within a small corporation, governed by the formal authority of the state remain
ideologically the antithesis of values founded on person-to-person, face-to-face
interaction. Thus, when they arise within a small organization, legal issues as such
initially appear marginal, overly technical, and inconsequential—maneuvering within as
its shield or medium of adjustment in relation to the political and economical
environment.
Yet, because they define relationships and specify rights and obhgations more
authoritatively than do other sources of authority within the enterprise, legal
arrangements are important in shying both the tone and substance of extended
shareholder relationships. Legal models of social organization crefuUy insert
themselves, as limited plans, into the affairs of the board members, and gradually, as
the company ages, come to structure its interpersonal relations by defining individual
relations to shared wealth.
Further, in their respective theories of modem industrial societies, Marx,
Schumpeter, and Veblen emphasized that wealth in the form of business coital is
fundamentally a metaphysical, abstract phenomenon, which it would be simplistic to
conceive of in materialist terms. Capital is shorthand for complex social processes and
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relationships of production in a market economy, just as m o n ^ is deceptively tangible
as a concq)t, standing for a system of exchange.
As it matures in a context of the closely held or family corporation, capital in
surrogate form assumes a more resonant sociological and symbolic, rather than
economic, importance, thus highlighting through its legal constitution the multiple
abstract dimensions of possessing considerable wealth in Western industrial societies.
This insight is particularly relevant to an understanding of organized ownership
of wealth, in which the owners never really "see" or touch their collective wealth as a
totality in the form of coital, property, or money. Rather, they only experience it
through a calculus of relative interests estabUshed by a set of legally organized and
sanctioned relationships. The precise form and quantity of any part of the abstract
wealth are only determinable within the framework of specific transactions among
owners, itself governed by legal rules.
To effectively compete, or even survive, in market environments that have
become complex after periods of relative stability frequently requires organizations to
undertake the process of dramatic, and often traumatic strategic change. Increasingly,
this type of change is seen not just as a shift in norms, structures, processes, and goals,
but also as a form of "second-order change" involving a fundamental alteration in the
social construction of reality (Berger and Luckman 1967). This view suggests that
strategic change involves, at its essence, a cognitive reorientation of the organization
(Gioia and Chittipeddi 1991): one that reflects an acceptance of perceptual, structural,
and contextual discontinuities that occurs through the shifting interplay of emergent
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processes.
From this cognitive perspective, the success of strategic change efforts dqiends
not only on the organization's ability to undergo a significant shift in direction, vision,
and values, but also the ability of stakdiolders to understand and accq)t a new
concq>tualization of the organization. The impetus for this kind of change often hes
with both a company's board of directors and its top management who are the key
actors in articulating the need for, and intended nature of the impending change. It is
in this attempt to forge an understanding and acceptance of an alternative strategic
reality among corporate stakeholders that influence (Pfeffer 1981), sensemaking (Gioia
and Chittipeddi 1991), and symbohsm (Pfeffer 1981) are likely to be critically
important.
Although the role of dramatic change in affecting organizational outcomes has
been well-documented, the processes involved in promoting cognitive understanding,
acceptance, and institutionaUzation of a new organizational reahty during strategic
transitions have not been well studied. The purpose of this study was to examine the
dynamics involved in constructing new understandings in the embryonic stages of a
strategic change effort. I tracked, from inception, the proceedings of the reconstituted
board of directors of the Softalk Corporation, which was instrumental to the change
process at Softalk, and studied the means by which the members of the board came to
understand not only their roles, but also the constraining and facilitating factors that
affected their ability to instigate change. I used a grounded approach (Glaser and
Stauss 1967) to discover dimensions and nuances involved in the governance and
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change processes. The general research question guiding this study was framed as
follows; In a corporation where strategies and structures have been established, what
board processes characterize the development and acceptance of new realities
associated with the launching of radical change?
While wishing to c^tu re the flavor of the corporate board of directors'
environment, I have equally salient theoretical aims. I wish to present an
organizational sociology that is grounded in interactionist and cultural concerns, but
does justice to the reahty of the organization and the equal, insistent reahty of the
environment outside the organization. Through my ethnogr^hy I present a
perspective that accounts for the features of the organizational hterature while
remaining true to the hved experiences of the Softalk board members.
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CHAPTER2
HISTORICAL & THEORETICAL CONTEXT
The view that the cornerstone of the modem economy is the large firm dates back to
the onset the industrial revolution. This perspective has been the case especially in the
manufacturing sector where giant firms dominated throughout the first half of the
twentieth century. However, the "twin oil shocks" of the 1970s and 1980s have
triggered an unexpected reappraisal of the role and importance of small and emerging
manufacturing firms.
One of the main reasons that small and emerging enterprises have been
"understudied" is that for the better part of this century, it was a widely held behef
that small firms did not play an important part in the economy, and their role was
expected to diminish in the future. In country after country, official policies favored
large units of production and mechanisms of ownership. These goals were pursued in
free market and planned economies alike, in both developed and developing countries.
The origins of the general model of today's American business corporations can
be traced to the end of the Civil War. Contemporary formations evolved in the later
nineteenth century from the replacement of the eastern and southern gentry of colonial

8
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origins by a new entrepreneurial elite who engineered the growth and integration of a
national economy. The southem gentry declined r^ id ly as a result of the Civil War,
while the remnants of the eastern gentry lost their predominance in commerce but
retained their patron roles in certain cities. Both looked on as New York bankers and
industrialists took control of the national economy, defining a new upper-class culture
devoted to the accumulation and display of wealth, and promoting the spread of this
culture across the country (Persons 1973). Entrepreneurs in regional cities emulated
both high society styles and business methods of these newly rich.
Structural economic changes of the twentieth century, such as the complex
governmental regulation of corporate ownership and operations, and competition
within an environment of ever larger concentrations of capital, displaced individual
entrepreneurs and family firms from dynamic roles in the economy and challenged the
long-term viabüity of any fixed configuration of family-dominated economic interests.
A simultaneous ideological reaction against the holding of hereditary wealth resulted in
increased taxation of the private accumulation and inheritance of wealth and greater
limitations on the legal vehicles commonly used to preserve such wealth.
A deep underlying adherence to the principle that there were significant
economies to be reaped from large scale production was embedded in the classical
socialist model as well. Large units of production were viewed as the most efficient
means of transforming inputs into outputs, and any deviation from large scale
production was seen as a socially wasteful use of resources (Gilder 1980). This belief
in the inherent potential of scale economies, dating back to Karl Marx at least, was
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coupled with the view that it promoted the corporate form of organization which Marx
expected to lead to a constantly diminishing number of magnates of coital, who
would usurp and monopohze all advantages of transformation (Avineri 1968).

Lenin

was likewise obsessed with the efficiencies to be gained by large scale production
units. His expectations about the benefits of concmtration were further enriched and
developed for socialism by Stalin who implemented (disastrously) the economic
aspects of his view.
This was the world of countervailing power in whidi virtually every major
institution in society acted to reinforce the stabihty needed to promote mass production
in giant corporations. In fact, the unprecedented growth experienced in the West
during this period has been attributed less to technology than to prevailing social and
political forces working to provide the market stability required for successful mass
production. Thus, during the 1950s and 1960s in the West, the emphasis on large units
of production and scale economies did not seem to be at odds with the contemporary
economic doctrines about production. In both East and West, mass production was
seen as the technologically dynamic form of production.
The 1950s and 1960s were the zaiith of mass production in the United States.
Post-war model of economic development was dom inated by large corporation using
mass-production technologies in an environment of stable prices. At the turn of the
caitury the large corporation, through vertical and horizontal integration, had been able
to fix input and output prices; in the 1930s collective bargaining ensured wages were
fixed, balancing production and consumption; a decade later pubhc policy stabilized

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

11

the level of aggregate demand, the price level, interest rates, and the exchange rate.
Stable markets were necessary to accommodate production rates characteristic of big
firms. The specialized machinery needed to produce these quantities was expensive
and had to be amortized over a long period of time. This "fixed-price" environment
made the existence of mass production possible in an otherwise unstable world.
By the early 1970s "cracks" had begun to appear in the structure of the
manufacturing sector in some developed countries, including in some of the world's
largest firms and industries. At the same time, casual evidence began to suggest that
small firms in several countries were out-performing their larger counterparts. Perhaps
the best example was in the United States steel industry, where new firms in the form
of mini-mills and small firms expanded employment, while the incumbent large firms
shut down plants and reduced employment. This development following the twin oil
shocks triggered an unexpected re^praisal of the role and importance of small and
emerging manufacturing firms, resulting in a divergence of opinion on the importance
of firm size.
The endogenous instability of the mass-production model based on so many
production and social rigidities over the past century has given rise to what the authors
call an "industrial divide."

Certain historians contend that the distinction between the

1930s and 1970s was that, in the latter, there was great confusion over how to
organize technologies, markets and hierarchies (Hall 1991). In fact, if the Great
Depression represented a macroeconomic crises, the economic problems of the 1970s1990s were essentially microeconomic and sociological in that the focus was on the
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choice of technologies, organization of firms and industries, markets, and governance
models.
Equally important, since the origin of corporations as major engines of
economic activity, two great transformations have occurred in the typical distribution
of equity ownership of large companies in the United States. From the middle of the
nineteenth century through the 1930s, promoters and industrialists moved away from
dependence on wealthy individuals, bankers, and financial institutions for their siq)ply
of czgiital. Securities markets developed initially to siq)port trading in railroads and
canals, and efforts to finance the Civil War then greatly expanded trading in debt
securities (Persons 1973). After the war, utilities and ultimately corporations engaged
in other forms of heavy industry began movement of share prices, which then provided
a mechanism by which shareholders could collectively signal management about how
h ^ p y or unh^py they were with the way management was running the company.
The transition of a company from closely held to widely held and actively traded gave
shareholders the benefits of liquidity for their investments and some information about
what other investors think about how much a company was worth.
But the need for each individual shareholder to know or understand the details
of a company's business became much less pressing, and made it is much harder for
shareholders to have any direct influence over the company if they did not like the
way the company is being run. This separation of share ownership from control, with
all its ramifications, has become a much debated issue for corporate governance.
Emerging corporations, unlike large corporations, most often have limited
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access to traditional securities markets. This limited access is due to the m inim al
revenue streams and asset bases of such corporations. Additionally, these firms
usually have limited access to traditional debt instruments due to the inherently risky
nature of their enterprise. Therefore most emerging enterprises obtain debt and equity
financing in the form of venture capital or high risk debt instruments through the
private placement of stock. The private placement of stock (stock not sold on or
regulated by the securities exchange) has additional risks for the investors. In the case
of successful emerging corporations, this privately held stock is then traded for
pubUcally traded securities during the initial pubUc offering (IPO) of the corporation's
stock generally with a substantive incentive going to the owner of the private stock.
In general, separating equity holders from management through the financial
markets (whether private or pubUc) raises four types of governance problems:

*

For firms to operate efficiently, management must have enough leeway to take
risks, make strategic decisions, and take advantage of investment opportunities
as t h ^ arise. Management cannot submit every decision to a shareholder vote,
and, even if it could, shareholders who are not close to the operations of the
company probably would not be able to make informed decisions.
Nonetheless, management must be prevented from abusing its power and
position by spending resources or undertaking investments that benefit
management at the expense of the shareholders. Hence, shareholders need
mechanisms for effectively monitoring and restraining management.
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A small, close-knit groiq) of shareholders with a large total share of equity
might be quite ^ e c tiv e at monitoring management, but, if thty are given
enhanced control rights, then their power also must be restrained to prevent
them from taking unfair advantage of other shardiolders.

A major commitment of time and resources is necessary for investors (or
anyone else) to act as effective monitors. But many investors prefer the
advantages of liquidity and diversity in their portfbhos—advantages that
may not be consistent with the time and resource commitments involved in
monitoring.

*

Investors need rehable and accurate information, developed using consistent
measuring and accounting procedures. But any measure of performance can
provide misleading information or distorted incentives by encouraging
management to focus attention on in^propriate or partial goals. Moreover,
releasing certain kinds of information to the public can sometimes weaken a
company's competitive position.

For years governance in the emerging firm sector remained a "riddle wrapped
in a mystery inside an enigma" to borrow Winston Churchill's celebrated comment
about Russia. Since these corporations operate under the veil of the closely-held or
privately held corporate structure their governance and management styles and
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traditions go unnoticed by the public and academia alike. Yet, it appears that the
success or failure of these corporations have a significant impact on the lives of many
in our society, as small and emerging corporations accounted for nearly 39% of
American wages in 1991 (Daft, 1992). Only by a lifting of the corporate veil will we
be able to understand what makes these enterprises work. I believe that the best place
to start is with the top-rung—the corporate board of directors.

The Board o f Directors
Sitting on top of management of any company, working within a framework of laws,
regulations, and judicial decisions, is a board of directors. The way board members
play their roles—accepting and delegating responsibility, accountability, and authority
for the organization's success—influences the way the organization is led and controlled
at the very highest level. Board members are often called on to serve as arbiters when
goals of the owners of the business (shareholders) and those who control it
(management) come into conflict.
The primary responsibiUty of the board members to shareholders involves the
creation of wealth. They are responsible for seeing to it that the actions of
management increase the value of the stock. At the same time that board members are
pushing for short-term results, however, they are also responsibility for the long term
survival of the company, which may at times call for actions that will, in fact,
adversely affect short-term profitability.
Although the board needs to play a larger and somewhat different role in a
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start-up or new corporation, it is important that it not cross the line to management. It
is not, for example, up to the board to reformulate the strategy of the enterprise but
rather to expand the thinking, and ultimately the vision, of management, thus ensuring
that management has the information necessary to drive strategy in the right direction.
The board's aim is to focus management's concerns on what the organization should
do, rather than what it knows to do. The board should provide senior management
with a multifaceted understanding of the world beyond the immediate present
competitive environment (see W illiam son 1985).
Although most organizations begin as personal endeavors by single individuals
or small groups, as thty grow in size, a major change takes place, as described in
Adolf A. Berle, Jr., and Gardiner Means's landmark 1932 study of the corporation The
Modem Corporation and Private Property:

The typical business unit of the 19th century was owned by individuals or
small grotqis; was managed by them or their appointees; and was, in the main
limited in size by the personal wealth of the individuals in control. These
units have been supplanted in ever greater measure by great aggregations in
which tens and even hundreds of thousands of workers and property worth
hundreds of millions of dollars, belonging to tens or even hundreds of
thousands of individuals, are combined through the corporate mechanism into
single producing organization under unified control and management (1932:46).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

17

When the change from individual control takes place, management becomes the
responsibihty of overseers—a board of directors and the senior management of the
aitetprise. In theory and law, the board's job is to protect the shareholders' property
and oversee management. The contradiction here is that while "the cornerstone of US
corporate democracy is the shardiolders' right to elect the board,... (Berle and Means
1932:6) this role usually amounts to ratifying the board's nominations (which the chief
executive officer will have played an important part in formulating).
The controls on management stem from Securities and Exchange Commission
regulations that impose administrative rules on corporations designed to assure fair and
timely elections for directors, as well as to make sure that the corporations disclosed
all pertinent information to dissident shareholders, and from certain standards of
conduct arising from legal precedent. In addition, there are external forces that
impact, to varying degrees, corporate governance. For example, the union
representing automobile workers is affected by the costs of its members' health
insurance: Not only must the union's officers bargain over the benefit levels with their
members' employees to ensure the satisfaction of their members with union
management, they must pay the benefits when union members are periodically laid off.
Alliance parmers and major sipphers whose futures are affected directly by the
success of an organization also are increasingly concerned about governance decisions
and thus seek representation on boards.
A company in this sense is like a puppet, and the board, its puppeteer. The
puppet will respond only as a result of appropriate action being taken by the
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^propriate organ of control; either the shardiolders in a general meeting, or the
directors within their delegated powers and authority.
If the board purports, without the authority of the appropriate organ of control,
to act in a way that is b ^ o n d the company's corporate powers, then that act may be
totally invaUd (known as "ultra vires the company").
The board of directors will typically have vested in it wide powers of
management, with rights of delegation. It must act within the constraints laid down by
legislation, by the company's own Articles of Incorporation, and by other contractual
agreements, most notably those made by lenders, other financiers, loan stock trustees,
and/or shardiolders (e.g., under joint venture agreements or shareholders agreements).
If the directors purport to authorize the company to act beyond the powers
vested in the board (known as "ultra vires the directors"), then the directors can be
held personally Uable. However, a third party will still be able to hold the company to
its bargain unless the third party knew the act was ultra vires the directors.
In its custodianship of the affairs of the company, the board is primarily
answerable to shardiolders. There is also an annual requirement for directors to report
to shardiolders as to their custodianship at the annual general meeting where the
annual accounts, together with the directors' and independent auditors' reports thereon,
are presented.
Each director is also required to exercise his/her powers and functions with
proper care and ^propriate skill and diligence, so as not to cause the company loss by
his/her failure to do so. The scope and extent of these obhgations is somewhat vague.
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since there are no generally recognized standards as to the degree of skill, care or
dihgence required. The position of a director here contrasts with the standards that
have been more fully developed by case law for doctors, accountants, lawyers and
other professionals.
According to Georg Simmel in his The Philosophy o f Money (1900: 511), the
ideal purpose of money, as well as law, is to be a measure of things without being
measured itself, a purpose that can be reahzed only by endless development." Part of
this endless development is the board member who, in relation to the shareholder or
investor, is the concrete human incarnation of this abstract functioning of law and
money.
Another set of players—though not board members—who have an influence on
boards, are the "various levels of government [that] tax, subsidize, restrict, and control
business, in some cases impinging directly on matters as basic as pricing (rate
regulation, informal interventions into price setting) and the direction of investment
(zoning, required pollution control devices, limits on acquisitions). Yet another force
is the citizenry, including pubhc interest advocates and environmentalists, who often
manage to bring their voices into the boardroom through acquisition of stock—and at
times through board membership (Williamson 1985).
Corporations, like countries, have governments: Whether a corporation is the
equivalent of a dictatorship, a democracy, a confederacy, a commonwealth, or an
empire depends on strategic decisions made by its leaders about the rules and laws that
control the way the enterprise operates. At one end of the spectrum, corporations have
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hierarchical command-and-control ^proaches similar to those of the monarchies of
old. At the other extreme, th^r set themselves iç as loosely knit coalitions of
independent organizations joined together for financial advantage, an ^proach not
unlike that of the Holy Roman Empire, in which the ruler did Uttle more than collect a
percentage of the monies gained through the arrangements.
Problems such as maintaining profitabihty, achieving growth, and dealing with
continuous change result in constant attempts to reorganize and restructure because
companies have difficulty anticipating the need for new kinds of governance to suit
new worlds. Corporate organizations today need multiple governance styles at
different levels and in different functional areas, divisions, units, and locations. Unless
leaders understand the need for—and the effects of—this kind of governing "diversity,"
they will not be able to help their organizations achieve the flexibihty and adaptability
necessary to successfully walk the fine line between order and chaos.
In fact, many of the problems besetting corporate organizations arise from new
ways of working, such as teamwork or empowerment or alliance parmerships, all of
which have dramatic effects on strategic and operational governance. Leaders who
insist on adhering to a familiar style of governance at both these governance levels and
who make exceptions when they think they have no other choice find that exceptions
soon become the rule. The result is that, no matter what governance model is
siçposediy in place, the lines of authority, responsibility, and power soon become
blurred, creating problems ranging from confusion to total paralysis.
To ensure the right structure for the organization, corporate leaders have to
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modify governance models to encompass the changes they Ûiemselves siq)poit,
changes often made possible or driven by tedmological developments. Moreover, the
changes in lines of authority and responsibility—and the delegation of degrees of power
to different members of the organization—that accompany these governance decisions
must be crystal clear to all participants at all times.
Gaining an understanding of the governance model in use and the ways in
which the organizational form forces a multiplicity of models at different levels is
critical to understanding how the corporate organization wül be able to stay on a path
that neither leads to chaos nor descaids into order. The board of directors must
attempt to define the enterprise-level model in its continual interaction with
management.
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CHAPTERS
METHODOLOGY

I approached this study with two basic assumptions: first that organizational reality is
socially constructed and second, that attempts to change that reality should be studied
in a way that t ^ s into the processes used to fashion understanding by the participants
themselves, to avoid the imposition of ahen meanings iq)on their actions and
understandings. Therefore I deemed the interpretative approach to research to be most
^propriate with the font of my analysis being the negotiated order perspective; that
^proach to the interactionist understanding of organizations pioneered by Anselm
Strauss and his colleagues from the University of Chicago (Strauss, Schatzman,
Ehrlich, Bucher and Sabshin 1991). That is to say, I attempt to represent the
experiences and interpretations of aU participants and informants, without giving
precedence to prior theoretical views that might not be appropriate for their context.
In this work I have adopted a pragmatic stance toward interpretive research. To
be interpretive in this sense does not mean that as a researcher one has to engage in
deeper and deeper levels of subjective interpretation. Rather, I have tried to represent
the actors' experiential structure and subjective understanding in terms that are
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adequate at their level of meaning. My research reporting tries to maintain the
interpretations and experiaices of actors in the foreground. This style of reporting is
not a matter of granting precedence to the sensemaking experience of the actors, but is
rather one of resisting temptation to downplay it. In this ethnography, I take seriously
my responsibihty as a researcher to articulate how informant's views are informative.
In that vein, I give

u n c o m m on

attention to the insider's "commonsense" representations

of their experioice and interpretive worldview. The voice given to the actors,
however, is not some fawning attempt to take whatever the actors say at face value
without looking at the deeper structure of their interpretations and actions: the
presentation of their view is based on a quahtatively rigorous analysis (Corbin and
Strauss 1993).
Clearly, however, sole dependence on either an informant or a researcher
perspective presents an incomplete picture. Informant and researcher views each tend
to reveal and conceal different aspects of phenomena under study. Although informant
views can reveal rich means and methods by which members construct reahty (see
Garfinkel 1967), t h ^ usually do not address the deep structure of experience.
Similarly, although the researcher views tend to gloss the richness of lived
experience, thQf place in bas-relief the dimensions or structure of phenomena. In this
ethnographic work, I attempt to juxtapose the first-hand account with a grounded
theoretical analysis aimed at uncovering the underlying dimensions of the dynamics
involved.
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The Researcher's Role
The author has a fifteen year history of board membership on various boards
throughout the United States and Europe. The author's membership on the Softalk
board was made at the behest of the company's bank and was unanimously ratified by
a vote of the shardiolders. Members were aware of the author's reputation in the
business community and also were aware that the author was in graduate school. The
fact that I was studying sociology did seem strange to a majority of the members.
The author was nominated for and selected to be a member of the Softalk
Corporation's Board of Directors in May of 1995. All board meetings were tape
recorded by the company's Secretary with the complete knowledge of all members.
Additionally, abbreviated transcripts were made available to all board members, by the
Secretary of the company, within two weeks following each meetings. As a legal
formality, all prior meeting minutes were îçproved and signed by each board member.
A preliminary motion made by the member representing several minority shareholders
asked for and received unanimous consent from the board to allow members to
document and distribute any and all information concerning board activities, except as
either (1) limited in or by law or by a request from corporate counsel or, that (2)
anonymity or confidentiality of an utterance or document had been requested by any
member in writing to the other members of the board.
As is the case with most boards, members prepared individual and
personalized reviews of each meeting for their individual constituencies. Thus, by
being a board member, the author acquired a distinctive vantage for studying the
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processes by which an emerging corporation is governed. The role of the author was
therefore one of participant-observer, denoting the dual nature of my participatory and
observer status.
The participant-observer role allowed me to get as close as possible to the data,
so that 1 had direct experimce with the knowledge structures of the participants; it
provided information,meanings, and perspectives unattainable otherwise.
Data
The author used five primary sources of data: (1) his field notes, in the form of a diary
and meeting notes; (2) the tapes and transcripts of the Board meetings; (3) notes of
meetings with various company board members, employees and corporate stakeholders;
(4) all documents relating to or in siqjport of actions proposed for Board review; and
(5) my own weekly self-debriefing tapes consisting of reflections on the proceedings
of the Board.
The author employed conventional ethnographic analysis techniques in that I
used my membership in the organization as well as my interviews, notes, and
documentation to infer the subjective interpretations associated with the Board
experience. The research also relied heavily on the language used by the participants
during their interactions to try to infer the meanings and experiential understandings
(Huff 1983). As part of the due diligence process, multiple interviews (one to two
hours on average) were conducted monthly by and between the six members of the
Softalk Board of Directors and the ten members of Softalk senior management over a
twelve-month period.
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The Analysis Process
Over time, the author estabhshed close relationships with the principal participants
(including the CEO, the other Directors, President, the Executive Vice President, the
Director of Engineering and the key members of the sales, finance and engineering
staff) and acquired a sensitivity to the context and forces that might bear on the
Board's deliberations, hi my analysis, I used procedures based on the tenets of a
grounded-theory approach (Glaser and Strauss 1967), which typically involves
simultaneous data gathering and analysis. Initial data gathering was guided by the
central research question: What processes are involved in governance of the emerging
corporation? More specific questions emerged from the progression of my Softalk
experience.
The heart of the initial stage of the grounded approach is the method of
constant comparison (Conrad 1982-, Glaser and Strauss 1967, Strauss 1987), wherein
data from the many different sources (e.g., multiple informants) or from different
points in time are repeatedly compared to discem major categories, dimensions,
themes, or processes. Data from the transcripts, field notes, interviews, and documents
were repetitively reviewed, coded, categorized, and studied for content and meaning
until patterns emerged (Agar 1986, Miles and Huberman 1984, Spradley 1980). In this
study, a range of first-order informant codes (i.e., terms used by the actors; see Van
Maanen 1979) were developed by the actor-observer. 1 then assimilated these codes
into a set of summary analytical codes (i.e., labels induced by the researcher that were
still meaningful to the informants).

Based on these codes the 1 also began the process
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of inducing more general themes or dimensions in the data. Two tentative dimensions,
"meaning construction" and "influence and politics," emerged which then served as
guides for more focused data gathering and analysis (a process termed theoretical
sampling by Glaser and Strauss 1967).
After the initial stage of analysis was completed, the data were examined for
possible further aggregation into second-order categories and dimensions. This process
led to the assimilation and labeling of the code groupings at a more theoretical level as
a means of discerning general patterns in the data. The main outcome of this stage
was the emergence and formal labeling of two overarching dimensions of analysis;
"sensemaking" and "power/influaice." All relevant quotes, exchanges, decisions, and
actions were noted in the data by coding passages using both aggregated second-order
categories and these two overarching dimensions. These codings were then used to
guide further analysis in another iteration of theoretical sampling. For example, a
focus at this point was on further data that had bearing on either sensemaking or
power/influence. Guiding questions included; What means are used by members for
engaging in and communicating about attempts to make sense of their experience?
How is power exercised? How is influence accomphshed? Does this sensemaking
and power/influence processes change over time?
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CHAPTER4
THE SETTING
Softalk Corporation
The corporation under study is an emerging five year old high technology enterprise
with products and patents in telecommunications. The company's real name, address
as well as the biographical data on the participants have been changed to insure the
confidentiahty of their data. The company's main office is located in Suburbia, a large
community in the midwestem United States. It has small regional sales offices in five
cities throughout the United States.
At the time of this research, the company was on the threshold of a major
reorganization forced by the company's bank, which held over $5,000,000 of secured
and unsecured debt. As part of a previous restructuring, the bank had obtained the
right to restructure the board. More specifically, as a condition of extending the
current line of credit with the company, the shareholders had agreed to dismiss the
current board and allow the bank to approve the election of a new board of directors.
Additionally, the bank was reviewing the downsizing effort undertaken by the new
CEO and a small team of outside consultants.
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Not only was the firm unprofitable at this time, the more than twenty major
institutional shardiolders were uncertain as to whether they would continue to fund the
enterprise. Softalk's future was clearly in question.
Additionally, there was great disagreement among the major shardiolders on
the strategic direction of the company. Lastly, due to the retrenchment stance of the
previous CEO (the founder), the board was confronted with a legacy devoid of a longrange vision or plans for the firm. Although there had been earher attempts to
develop a corporate-wide strategic plans, these were all unsuccessful and ineffective.
In the words of the new CEO, they were: "Bullshit ! Nothing but self-serving window
dressing."
When the new bank-selected CEO arrived at the company he was presented
with a paradox; Softalk was in the most enviable patent position of any company in
the telecommunications industry, save AT&T, yet was itself unable to convert these
processes into a profitable product portfoho. The company was steeped in technology
and in debt. The youthful and talented engineering department was overtly wary of the
new foreign leader. Past attempts to restructure the firm had faced entrenched power
and political structures that had contributed to their failure. The history of failures had
made long-standing members of the firm's stakeholder community (most notably the
company's bank which held a significant amount of secured and unsecured company
debt) skeptical of new efforts to implement the drastic type of change needed for the
corporation to survive as a stand alone entity. Yet, because many of the institutional
investors were major customers of the bank, the bank agreed to try to work with the
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company.
The avowed goal of the new CEO was"...to make this company profitable and
take it public within thirty months..." Toward that end he pubUcally called for
"strategic change"; a new term for members of the company and one that was never
specifically defined except by examples of intended action (e.g., "We cannot continue
to develop all products for all people...We need to identify pockets of opportunity and
strike while the iron is hot ...We need to get everyone involved in saving monQf ")
Reengineering the company would, in the CEO's opinion, enable the corporation to
pursue a path to profitabihty. The CEO first broached the subject of reengineering at
a special meeting of the new Board of Directors called in the summer of 1995. He
stated that the focus was a necessary first step in changing the philosophy, values, and
ethic of the company
Since the board as a group had Uttle precedent on which to base its
deUberations and recommended actions it became impotent in the poUcy decision
process. Only two of the seven members had experience in the concepts of strategic
p lanning

and execution in small companies; most were lawyers or investment bankers

with no operations or turnaround experience. Thus, the Board was in a position of
constructing reality with which it would try to deal ( Weick 1977).
The People
Board members are, by law, ^pointed by a majority vote of the shareholders. In
addition, at Softalk, board members must also be approved by the company's bank.
Softalk's bylaws called for seven board members, each serving three year terms.
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Historically, in emerging corporations with limited shareholders (less than 35) major
shardiolders recommend a slate of directors whom they beheve wiU represent "their "
interests as well as the company's.
This "slating" process was the case at Softalk, where five major shardiolders
each nominated one individual to represait their interests. The bank recommended
two independent, also known as outside directors, who were accepted by a majority
vote of the shareholders. The author was one of those outside directors. The board
elected one of its members as a Chairman. All of the board members were well
educated, Caucasian, male, and over forty years old.
According to the corporate bylaws, attoidance at formal Board meetings
was restricted to the seven board members and a representative of the company's bank
without the advance ^proval of a simple majority of the board members. As a
courtesy to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) this rule was customarily waived to
allow specific individuals to provide data to the Board members. All of the names in
this text have been changed to protect the confidentiahty of the participants. These
individuals generaUy included the Softalk Corporate ControUer-Fred Murphy; the
company's Director of Engineering-Herb Krawcek; the company's marketing vice
president-Larry Gam and; a variety of legal experts who presented their findings on
subjects ranging from patent filings, international trade law, and htigahon.
One of Softalk's corporate formahties was that it had to maintain a board of
directors of seven members. Four of the seven board seats were predetermined by a
complex set of negotiations outlined in the company's shareholder agreements. The
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rem aining

three seats were reserved for the founder and two additional members who

"were suitable to a simple majority of the outstanding shares as voted at the annual
meeting to be held on the second Tuesday in Mardi of each year.” The founder and
the additional two members were to hold their seats for three year terms. Although, in
reahty, they were "at will" seats. I was elected in the spring of 1995 to the board at
the suggestion of the CEO whom I had known through another board in which we
were both non-executive members. Prior to coming "on board" I had never met any of
the other members prior to the selection interview process.
The new chief executive of Softalk was Jose Lopez, an aristocratic native
Venezuelan electrical engineer. Jose had been educated in America at a large
midwestem state college. For nearly twenty-five years after graduating college, Jose
chmbed the ladder at AT&T, reaching the position of Regional Vice-President. In
response to the pending 1980's breakup of AT&T he left and became President of the
U.S. operations of a large J^anese telecommunications company.
The founder, Murray Rothstein was a board member. Originally, he was the
majority shareholder of Softalk. However, the many previous rounds of equity
financing had now made him a minority (less than five percent of the outstanding
shares) shareholder.
Jim Black was a board member. He had secured the initial equity funding to
start the company from his wife. He was a venture capitalist and former professor of
computer science at a small midwestem university.
Tim Daley, a well known tax lawyer in Suburbia, was a board member. Tim
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represented one of his clients' investment in Softalk. That client was one of the largest
family trusts in the country. He was Ivy League educated and had originally worked
for Price Waterhouse.
Bob Johnson, was an insurance company lawyer and Softalk board member.
Bob was employed by one of the nation's largest insurance companies. His company
had invested over a miUion dollars in Softalk. Bob often described himself as a
"company man" and "corporate bureaucrat."
Len Dickey was a venture capitahst and lawyer. He had invested the funds of
several of his major chents into Softalk. He also served as Chairman of Softalk. He
had strongly supported the initial hiring of the new CEO.
Tom Sarris was a lawyer and board member. Tom represented the interests of
a major international materials company which had acquired an interest in Softalk
through the acquisition of another firm earher the previous year. Tom always
characterized his company's position on Softalk's corporate endeavor's as "hands-off."
He rarely spoke at meetings.
The Place
The majority of Softalk's employees work at the main office (over 250 of the 300 plus
employees). All of the corporation's major activities such as sales, marketing, legal,
research & development, accounting, assembly & test, quality assurance,
administration and field service were located at the facihty on Mason Street. The
Mason Street facility was shared with three other high technology companies. These
enterprises were all subsidiaries of Fortune 500 firms. The building was a one story
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glass structure spread over ^proximately 500,000 square feet of rolling meadow (of
which Softalk rented nearly 90,000 square feet), surrounded by a large asphalt parking
mall.
The Softalk side of the parking lot is filled with a variety of vehicles. Directly
in front of the building are seven parking spaces, three empty spaces marked
"customer" and four spaces with vehicles. A spotless new maroon four door Cadillac
Seville sits parked in a space marked "Vice President -Sales"; a brilliant red two door
Dodge Viper with a license plate reading -"SOFTALK"- in the space marked
"President"; in the space marked " Engineering" is a rather dirty drab bluegreen late
model Toyota Celica beginning to succumb to the ravages of metallic oxidation, and
on the end in the space marked "Vice President" is a late model white diesel Volvo
station wagon. The remainder of the well lighted and well groomed lot is a potpourri
of foreign and domestic vehicles parked in no discernable order. The majority of the
cars ^ p e a r to be two door models and of Japanese origin.
The outside of the building is neat and modem. One can see into virtually
every office from the outside, as the both the exterior and interior walls ^ p e a r to be
made of glass. The corporate signage is chiseled into a large rectangular oak structure
on the sidewalk in front of the building.
After entering the building one is immediately confronted by an oversized
reception area more fitting for a large medical clinic than for an emerging hightechnology corporation. The fern density is urmecessarily high and is offset only by
two large computer-like boxes—one marked the Softalk 9600 and the other marked
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Softalk 1600. Bdiind and to the right of the reception area are a set of double doors,
made of thick walnut, that reach ftom the ceiling to the floor and are at least eight feet
across. To the side of this expanse, at about eye level are two shinny gold plates. One
reads "BOARDROOM", the other "MEETING IN PROGRESS".
Upon entering the Boardroom, one is immediately struck by the expansive use
of walnut. The forty foot table is solid walnut, the walls are wainscoted in walnut.
The podium is walnut. The twenty high backed black leather chairs have walnut
bases. Even the individual place settings are equipped with walnut covered items to
include nameplates and pen and pencil sets. In the center of the table are several
electronic devices. A special high technology speaker phone and a voice activated
t ^ e recorder. Unlike the remainder of the complex there is a conspicuous absence of
windows and natural light. A fragrance of power permeates the room.
My space, like that of each member, was clearly delineated. In addition to my
place setting, there were extra pencils and pens, yellow legal-style writing pads, two
large bottles of water, one carbonated, one not, and a six inch stack of p^ers, the top
one marked "Board of Directors Meeting Agenda-Confidential".
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CHAPTERS
BOARDROOM PROCESSES AT SOFTALK
The Board Meeting
Traditionally, boards conduct their official business at formal board meetings.
Meetings are an important sense-making form for organizations because they define,
present, and also reproduce social entities and relationships. In this way, individuals
may both use and be used by this form. As a sense-making form, meetings are
significant because they are the organization or

com m u n ity

writ small. There may be

other competing symbols for an organization, such as individual leaders, a building or
territory, an organizational chart or logo. However, a meeting is a powerful and
ongoing social symbol because it assembles a variety of individuals and groups
together and labels the assembly as community action.
Meeting and meeting talk as objectified in minutes, reports, and the like may
also become the major evidence of organizational action. Political language and
rhetorical studies that consider language as action (Fine 1984) and that argue that
"saying is doing" also support this view for a variety of societies.
The idea that meeting talk may be synonymous with organizational action
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requires questioning the standard view that meetings exist as a facilitating form for
making decisions, formulating policy, solving problems, or resolving a crises. It is
possible to suggest that decisions, policies, problem solving, and so forth are not what
meetings are about. Instead, we need to reverse this view and examine the possibility
that meetings are what decisions, policies, problems, and crises are about. From this
vantage point, meetings help produce organization, although it is much more common
to assume the opposite. This ^proach sets meetings at the center of our understanding
of organizational systems.
At the same time that meetings may be a major form of organizational identity,
once a meeting has been constructed, the event becomes a vehicle for the reading as
well as validation of social relations within a cultural system. Meetings are a
successful social validating mechanism because acceptance of form requires, at least in
part, acceptance of the current social and cultural order (Dimaggio 1991). A formal
meeting requires the negotiation and ultimately the acceptance of a set of social
relationships that define someone's right to call and arrange a meeting, to specify time
and location, to start and end a meeting, a series of rules and conventions for ordering
and regulating talk, and recogrtition of this as talk that may be legitimated by the
meeting.
Much of human understanding occurs through the use of symbolic processes
(Axley 1984). A symbol can be any sign that represents a concept; thus, the
representation of the concept becomes the symbol's "meaning" (Geertz 1973). The
most pervasive medium of symbolism is language. In particular, the use of metaphor.
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wherein one concept is understood in terms of another concept already known (Ortony
1975), is k ^ to understanding (Daft 1983). Indeed, conceptual systems are
fundamentally met^horical in nature. When we try to understand a new experience or
concept, we do so by trying to ascribe meaning to it, and meaning is often most
effectively grasped through symbolic met^horical rqiresentations. Thus, symbols and
especially language symbols (such as visionary images and metaphors) are basic to the
process of sensemaking.
When people are called içon to enact some change in their existing patterns of
thinking and acting, the proposed change must make sense in a way that relates to
previous understanding and experience (Louis 1980). Symbols and met^hors are key
to this process (Huff 1983), in part because their inherent ambiguity provides a bridge
between the familiar and the strange, thus fostering a sense of continuity while
simultaneously facilitating change. In this sense symbols both conceal and reveal facts
of change. They conceal threatening aspects within the camouflage of the known, yet
reveal those aspects that emphasize the difference but, differences are rendered in
terms that echo the familiar (M ^er 1984). When a major change is proposed,
different symbolic language is used to herald the change and to articulate its nature.
Our focus, therefore, often is on the language used by organizational actors during a
leadership crisis.
Sensemaking, however, involves not only "pure" cognitive interpretation
processes, but interpretation in conjunction with action. In organizations, people take
into consideration the realized or likely outcomes of their own actions or those of
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other significant stakeholders in trying to understand what to do next. Not only is
language symbolic, but action itself is symbolic (Feldman and March 1981),
especially in organizations. In particular, symbolic action is central to the institutional
legitimacy of the proposed changes, peifa^s as a way of making proposed new
arrangements subjectively plausible (Berger, Berger and Kellner 1973).
Symbolic actions are frequently used by executives to legitimate decisions and
strategies that affect perceptions of the organization by members and other
stakeholders. In attempting to change leaders in an entrepreneurial corporate
environment, it is arguably necessary to first formulate a strategy to facilitate
acceptance of the "need for change." Such a strategy depends on symbolic procedures
to legitimize the transition process. Gaining insight into the symbolic meaning
structures of organizations and especially into the origins and manipulations of these
meaning structures allows an understanding of the creation and maintenance of
alternative organizational realities. (Strauss et al. 1991)
Symbols, met^hors, and actions, however, are not the only means for making
sense of organizational experience. Both sensemaking and action-taking are affected by
the context in which they occur. In organizations, context often is defined by
influence relationships and political structures, an observation that applies to small
companies as much as large bureaucracies. The construction of organizational reality,
therefore, is in some significant measure also likely to be influence-based. When
sense must be made of observed events or proposed changes, people account for
influence relationships in deciphering or ascribing meaning to a situation. Yet,
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influence in organizations is often more covert than overt; subtlety is its hallmark,
because powerholders seldom flaunt their influence ability (Frost 1987).
One of the few occasions that influence is likely to be manifested in visible
ways, however, is during change efforts. Even then, however, influence is likely to be
subtle, i.e., couched in symbolic representations (Lukes 1974). Thus, influence
processes are likely to occur in concert with symbolism, which suggests a potentially
complex interrelationship among symbols, symbolism, influence, and sensemaking.
This perspective also suggests that they can have an instrumental role in
accomplishing major change in addition to their long-noted expressive role (Edelman
1964). Symbols, therefore, not only constitute a medium for sensemaking, but for a
medium for influence as well.
One must also recognize that the symbols, visions, and construction of some
actors (most notably corporate directors and officers) are more powerful than others,
and therefore exert greater influence over the meanings attributed to various actions or
events (Gerth and Mills 1946: 152).
Organizations are political systems. Those in charge must create order among
people with different interests and agendas. Politics represents one of the processes
that determine who gets what, when, and how in a legitimate manner. Power, in turn,
is the ability of individuals or groups to exercise control over these processes (Morgan
1986; Pfeffer 1981; Kanter 1977).
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An Overview o f the Board's Governance o f Commitments to Unsuccessful Decisions
Peifa^s the most obvious symptom of organizational troubles at the Board level is
management commitment to unsuccessful decisions. Staw (1980) has noted that the
tendency to justify past actions can be a powerful motivation behind organizational
bdiavior and can often run counter to rationality. As he observes, the justification
process leads to escalating commitment. When mistaken actions are not being seen as
mistaken actions, the principle on which they are made is also not seen as mistaken.
Worse, the feeling that the principle is valid becomes enhanced through the need to
defend the decision, and thus further decisions are made on the basis of it.
This process is especially lethal in the case of a totalitarian organization, where
the idea of the perfection of the organization provides the organization's motivational
base. Here the assumption of the identity of the individual decision-maker and his or
her organizational role turns the taidency to justify past actions from a defensive
tendency on the part of individuals to a core organizational process—a central element
of the organization's culture. Such was the case at Softalk.
It will be useful here to differentiate between totalitarian management and
idealistic or "transformational" (Bums 1978) leadership. Idealistic leadership involves
belid^ in the organizational as an organizational ideal, but it relies upon a vision of
the future that is honestly held and promulgated by the leaders. When the
organization catches up with the consequences of its actions and finds them
importantly at variance with its earlier idealistic intentions and projections—when it
comes to know, in other words, that the decision was a bad decision—it has the choice
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of either acknowledging its failure, and hence its deviation from the ideal, or of
denying its failure, and attempting to maintain the image of itself as ideal through
decq)tion and compulsion. In the former case, it is possible that through imagination
and creativity a revised ideal can be formulated. Even if it is not, the organization
will at least have learned something. In the latter case, the organization turns toward
totalitarianism.
The case of the Softalk 9600 illustrates the process of commitment to
unsuccessful decisions. Modeled after a competitor's product, the 9600 was powered
by a proprietary set of circuit cards rather than utilizing the power of the standard
personal computer platform available through a variety of reputable vendors to such as
IBM, NEC, and Gateway Corporation. The problems with developing new proprietary
hardware were well known and documented by Softalk's engineering staff long before
the 9600 was offered for sale. Understanding the significance of the following
commentary requires attending to the time it took to reverse the original bad decision.

Member 2

"The questionable technology of the 9600's design has caused a massive
internal fight among Softalk's engineers...On one side of the argument is
Rothstein [Softalk's former President] ...On the other side are the top
engineers...."

Member 4

"The top engineer Herb Krawcek told me that he showed his time and
cost estimates to Rothstein but by then, he said, "Rothstein's

mind
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made iç."

Member 6

"In the end, the old board not only went along with Rothstein, it also
told Krawcek in effect to stop the objections. Get on the team, or you
can find someplace else to work."

The ill fated 9600 was launched in the fall of 1992. The results were disastrous. Itwas
only a few months before the customer service department was inundated with
complaints over the machine's reUability.
When the new CEO Lopez, fully took over the company's reins in the winter of
1994, he insisted that he be given corporate authorization to fix the problem. Initially
his request was turned down by the old board as "too expensive." Ultimately, under
the threat to resign, the old board relented. But it was too late.
(As a postscript, to date, hundreds of thousands of dollars have been spent in
warranty and legal expenses to remedy the design flaws of the Softalk 9600.)
Explanations of business disasters often assume that the disaster was the result
of a single, isolated decision that was wrongly made. Indeed, it is typically asserted
that the decision-making process employed was one that is ordinarily valid but that, in
the specific case, crossed some vague boundary that led to disaster.
Explanations for disasters like these take for granted that the organizational
context of the decision was basically sound. Set against the presumed backdrop of the
organization's continuing healthy activity, the decision and the disaster that follow
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from it are seen as an aberration, an unfortunate accident—as much a tragedy for the
well-meaning and generally competent individuals who made the decision as for its
more direct victims.
While this scenario is certainly accurate in many instances, there are other
cases in whidi an opposing vision may be closer to the facts. Here, the specific
decision is sear as fundamentally flawed and as taking place within a generally
unsound organizational context. Indeed, from this point of view, the decision is only
one of the many bad decisions that the unhealthy organization generates naturally and
almost inexorably.

A n Overview o f the Board's Governance in the Strategic Planning Process
The board met once a month for four to six hours at a time. One of the members
provided a retrospective synopsis of board life that serves as a foreshadowing
overview of a narrative from my daily diary that follows:

My initial meeting indicated no agreement as to purpose, required action, or
vocabulary, leading to the development of a modest sense of desperation over
the next several meetings. Soon, however, the leadership provided a way out
of the quandary by invoking the obstensive preferences of a higher authority
figures (the CEO), who suggested a symbolic framework for initiating strategic
change. This symbol became the construct for rallying around a unified
direction that eventually led to substantive action.
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Because the fmdings are woven into the rather complex narrative that follows,
it is helpful to preview not only the events that transpired, but also the main
theoretical concepts that subsequently were generated from the study. As noted
earher, two primary dimensions emerged; sensemaking and power/influence. Both
dimensions were symbolically based and served as miming themes over the life of the
study. The board progressed through four phases. During these phases the nature of
the sensemaking and influence attempts underwent transitions, both in terms of the
symbols and m et^hors used to communicate understanding and action, and in terms
of the "directionality" of the processes (i.e., whether they were directed inward toward
the board, or directed outward by the board toward others). Exhibit I presents a
desriptive summary of these phases including representative quotes.
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Diteipretatioii

Definition

Description
"Who are we? and what is are charge? Are key
questions posited during this stage. Attempts
are made to interpret experience outside
models and historical referrents. The board
becomes aware o f external influences that
have the potential to constrain thought and
action.

Description
Top management attempts to define
strategic change issues for key stakeholders
by using the board as a conduit. The board
becomes aware that they are being used by
top management as a symbol for change.
In response the board begins to define its
role as facilitator.

Quotes

Quotes

We have a charge Grom the bank which I didn't
understand then and 1 don't understand now.
* What are business units? I don't understand your
strategic either.
* It's not clear who is going to make the real decisions
or even make recommendations on the strategy.
* I hope they give us some guidance on this stuff.
* Lets look at the planning process o f [Softalk] over
the last two years.
* We need to account for the CEO's views.

* The CEO just won't take on the
engineers.
* This is the CEO's plan we re peddling.

*

*I f it goes bad, he'll dump it on us.
* Gam wants to establish OUR criteria.
* Be careful what you say to others.

Legitimation

Institutionalization

Description

Description

Top management preferences continue to
influence the board. To legitimize itself, the
board begins to align with top management. The
board also develops its own concepts and terms for
"giving" sense to top management and stakeholders
using tactics o f inclusion and cooptation.

Both the board and top management
attempt to institutionalize change
and planning processes. The board
crafts a formal statement to
influence and create the desired
meaning for stakeholders.

Quotes

Quotes

We are creating terms that are relatively valuefiree; then we give them meaning for others to use.
* Hopefully, we can convince the CEO that we are
serious... and we mean business.
* He is trying to influence us again with HIS plan.
* We have to make this acceptable or be at war with
the engineers.

* We are going to institutionalionalize it.
* We have the power now.
* This is a radical solution for this place.
* We need to say up-firont that we are
different fi'om the previous escapades.
* We should get one o f us as COO. This
would assure we stay in control.

*

Exhibit 1
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The hiteipretation Phase
The early meetings of the Softalk Board were distinguished by attempts of the
members to construct some identity for themselves and some interpretation of their
charge. These attempts were foundering, triai-and-error efforts to answer the
fundamental questions: Who or what are we? What are we sxçposed to do? Given
the lack of historical analogues, such ^parently simple questions turned out to be very
difficult indeed. Members described their situation as "having no precedents," "being
at ground zero," and saw several meetings as fraught with "mayhem" and "confusion."
The following exchange cultures their nascent state and the effort to arrive at some
interpretation of their task:

Chair:

"Our charge is to examine all of the alternatives. We are
conducting strategic p lanning and survival management at the
same time." (pause)

Member 1:

"I don't understand what that means, (pause) I don't understand
"alternative levels" either."

Member 2:

" We are hoping you would explain!"

Member 3:

" I just don't understand. What do you want me to do? I need to
know when we expect to be done here."

Clearly "survival management" was intended to be a meaningful, action-oriented
metaphor in this scenario, but the members did not have a workable definition of it.
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Even after lengthy discussions, the issue repeatedly surfaced:

Chair:

"Again 1 think the main thing we need to do is identify the
meaning of "survival management" and "strategic planning."

Member 2:

"Are you speaking from our or the bank's perspective?
You mean from the bank's perspective."

Primarily, the early meetings consisted of rqieated attempts at figuring out the
board's purpose and role, as well as efforts devoted to negotiating the meaning of key
terms (which occurred on at least eleven sqiarate occasions during the first meeting
alone). The multiple discussions surrounding the central notion of strategic planning
were based on such metaphoriced representations as: strategic planning units as
"constituent parts or atoms," "planning machinery," "centers of excellence"; all of
which were proposed and discussed, but were never established as defining metaphors.
At these early meetings, the Chairman alluded to senior management's notion
that emulating another company's planning model might be a possible way to help
define their own situation. ("He wants us to have a look at the Motorola model;
thinks it might give us some ideas ") Although that model was dismissed at that point
(though revisited later), the influence of top management and other stakeholders on the
board's efforts now was evident. As this initial phase of the board's development
progressed, members became aware of the effect of the actions and desires of others
on their own thinking and possible actions, which engendered considerable indignation
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and affective reaction by other members who argued for autonomy in deciding how
they might frame the change problem and what they could and should do to address it.
Nonetheless, there were several attempts to infer "what the bank wants," a reference
to the bank's implied power to define the situation in terms of their stated "ongoing
concern" status.

The Definition Phase
As the board continued to flounder, a sense of powerlessness and resignation settled
in. (It seems to me that you're either a surrogate of the CEO or you're nowhere ") In
addition, the members began to suspect that they were being used as a symbolic
device in top management's attempts to sway other stakdiolders, especially the bank,
to "buy into" the strategic change notion. For one thing, the mere existence of the
prominent and "new" board signified a serious (albeit nebulous) intent to change. The
members also began to see that the CEO's public statements limited their range of
possible thinking and acting and made them pawns in some larger game;

Member 2:

"He's done it again

He's gone around us.....

You know, I am starting to believe that the son-of -a-bitch
believes we are nothing more than a rubber stamp... "

During this phase of the board's evolution there were several pronounced
allusions to the strong symbolic implications of not taking certain actions, e.g., of not
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defining a strategic business unit to include certain constituent groiqjs, especially those
coveted by multiple factions. This tactic prefigured a running theme in deliberations;
overt attempts to anticipate the meaning of decisions and actions (to themselves and
others) as a way of avoiding trouble. Avoidance, in the form of considered non
action, was a proactive tactic. Of particular importance, the members were sensitive
about signaling any impaiding drastic actions;

Member 6;

"I think it would be unwise to stray too far from the current
structure..."

Member 3;

"Let's make sure we consult the right people first....
I am extremely nervous about the engineers' reaction..."

Eventually the board members defined a role for themselves as facilitators and
governors in managing the change process. Still, t h ^ failed to develop a framework
for envisioning specific processes to be used, and their

. of consensus and inaction

invited external intervention.

The Legitimation Phase
If the earlier board deliberations were aimed at answering the questions "Who are
we?" and "What should we do?", subsequent events were focused on a related but
different series of questions; "How can we be perceived as legitimate agents of
change?" "How can we exert influence (without bringing on conflict and
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countervailing influence)?" "How can we accommodate the CEO in disseminating the
market leader vision?" By far the greatest direct influence on the board was the CEO
himself who siqiplied the specific charge for the committee, shaped their framework
for strategic planning, and (either intentionally or unintentionally) affected board's
actions via his public declarations. Although the members recognized his influence
tactics ("He's fucked us again!") and chafed about them ("I think politically we're
driven to do what he wants"), they ultimately accepted them as legitimate.

("He is,

after all, the CEO ") Consequently, the board aligned themselves with the CEO as a
way of obtaining surrogate legitimization for themselves. Ultimately this is the CEO's
strategic plan. We need to present ourselves as implementors of the CEO's wishes.
In addition to the CEO, other individuals and groups held considerable sway,
including other top managers (e.g., the head of engineering), and other stakeholders
(e.g., the bank, which argued that its "traditional role" was being ignored). Concern
over the reactions of these groups, in particular the bank's, continued to receive
attention. The members continued to be wary of this presumed nemesis whom they
assumed would try to sabotage the change process. Therefore, they kept working to
avoid a confrontation.

Member 6:

"[We need to] recognize that these people will feel they're being
undermined or excluded and will try to do something about it."

Member 3:

"You can pick your sides, marshal your troops and hope you

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

52

win. But I don't see the sense in making a war out of it."

The symbolic importance of allowing potentially recalcitrant factions to play a role
became a key issue affecting not only the credibility of the board, but its viability as a
change agent as well. The tactic adopted was one of inclusion and co-optation;

Member 2;

"There have to be senior managers, department heads, other
administrative mid-level people, and employees that have to feel
a sense of ownership of the plan all up and down the line."
We should also give appropriate input to vendors, customers, and
even people outside the company who have a strong stake in
this."

In the latter part of this phase, however, the board began to move toward an
influencing stance of its own. Although members couched their attempts at influence
in terms of trying to communicate "what the CEO wants," they also tried to develop
themselves into a force to be reckoned with.

Member 4;

"Let's not ask for advice; if we ask for advice, we'll get it."

Members recognized the paradox that in order to create the context for strategic
change, which implies radical redirection, they had to avoid the appearance of
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proposing radical change;

Member 4;

"Let's not fiick this up, I mean lefs not let those engineers get
involved and start redirecting it"

A feature judged to be necessary to ally fears and disarm resistance or even
attempted sabotage of the process. In actuality, t h ^ viewed the new corporate design
as a smokescreen that concealed the real change vehicle from those that might
undermine the process, the iimocuous "Business Units" that contained the potential for
triggering substantive change. A one member put it;

Member 2;

"This is just a way to finesse the real teeth in the new mission
and goals thing without suggesting that we have a final planning
formulation. This way, there won't be any consternation with
this stuff that will cause people to want to shoot you down."

The role of the business units was described with the rich metaphor, "prisms
transmitting a spectrum of inputs." Taken collectively, the business units were
variously, but convergently, described as "beads on a necklace" and "pearls on a
cheiin" to connote their role as components of the strategic change effort and
associated planning "system" that would generate strategic change.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

54

The Institutionalization Phase o f the New Board
Di the final work of the board during year one, attention turned toward the construction
of an influential statement that would explain and give rationales for their
recommendations to outside constitumcies. There was a keen awareness on the part
of the members that the language of this rqiort was very important to convQf the
desired meaning to outsiders as well as to top managemoit.

Member 5:

"They [the board's recommendations] have meaning in this
context; they do not yet have meaning b^^ond it."

In the attempt to create the desired meaning, multiple instances of
"wordsmithing" were noted by writers, i.e., labels and language were intentionally
selected to conv^ the "right message." The final report itself was an overtly symbolic
document cast in metaphorical and rhetorical terms.

Member 5:

"We are trying to identify a dominant chord from amid the
cacophony of individual planning documents."

The report attempted to describe not only the need for restructuring, strategic
planning and change, but the approach to be taken by the company.

It provided

rationales for adopting the proposed strategic planning process and became the primary
statement of the direction of the strategic change effort.
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In this final phase of the board's initial year of life their attempts to exert their
own influence increased as did their attempts to lend permanency to their vision and
proposed actions; these were mainly efforts by the board to influence their
constituencies to accept their way of thinking while avoiding conflicts that might
undermine the delicate process. These discussions were life with met^horical
description, with a marked preference for war m et^hors

Member 3:

"I know we have to bite the bullet, but I don't want to
immerse this thing in a huge struggle..."

Once again, the idea of vesting power in the mid-level managers to decide
their own planning targets was affirmed, thus averting a likely rebellion by the
engineering department:

Member 1:

"This should get it past the techno-geeks, who could scuttle this
whole thing completely..."

As a result, the board began a series of attempts to "co-opt" or "draft"
stakeholders. These attempts ranged from stressing how the "long-term viability" of
the company would be enhanced if the board's recommendations were adopted, to the
adoption of a political strategy that focused on aligning the board with the CEO as a
means of garnering support. They also attempted to engineer the appointment of one
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of the board members as Chief Operating Officer because he had "sufficient
understanding and clout to make sure the thing will work out."
As a more overt example of influence, the board culminated their efforts by
attempting to forge the final document into an instrument of lasting impact. Of critical
importance to the board was the goal of "internalizing" the change effort through the
board's recommendations;

Member 3:

"What we are trying to institutionalize here is that both missions
and goals are locked in right at the top: in the CEO's office, in
the board, and in our recommendations."

Member 4:

"What we're suggesting to be implemented becomes part of the
general strategic planning process. We'll put it in a plan that the
CEO can push."

Member 5:

"We want to enculturate Softalk toward the concept and
associated structures of strategic planning."

These efforts were deemed to be a necessary step toward a major strategic change.
Indeed, the CEO declared that strategic plan and reengineering would be the lasting
legacy of his administration.
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CHAFTER6
ANALYSIS & INTERPRETATION
Discussion
Contained within the first-order narrative are a number of substantive findings about
the nature and uses of symbolism, sensemaking, and influence processes. But, to tease
out their deeper structure requires not only reference to the "story," but also analysis
from a second-order level. Such an analysis does not discount the first-order findings
(which are adequate at the level of meaning of the informants; see Weber 1946), but
employs an alternative view to gain insights using a more "theoretical" perspective.
At this level of analysis, I began by treating the first-order findings as data. I first
attended to the insights generated from the case itself, as well as the ethnographer's
interpretation of it, focusing in particular on key terms and events (Isabella 1990). I
then employed the procedures described in the Method section to aggregate the firstorder codes and categories, assign them second-order thematic labels, and then induce
the overarching dimensions of sensemaking and power/influence. I begin by
summarizing the significant events in the narrative.
First, an examination of the narrative progression, as well as the codes and
categories, reveals a pervasive use of symbols and metaphors in the board's attempts to
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make saise of their experience. "Market niche " quickly became the overarching
visionary symbol and "survival management" soon became the dominant operational
symbol. "Strategic planning" emerged as an ambiguous, ill-defined, but nonetheless
guiding m et^hor in this context (i.e., in a smaller enterprise that, unlike most large
businesses, had not previously employed this specific concept). An array of
stqpporting metaphors and other ridi language infused every phase and aspect of the
board's attempts at framing, defining, interpreting, and acting upon issues. In addition
to the many considerations of symbolic actions involving the board, the symbolic
implications of not taking some apparently logical actions also played a significant
role, mainly as a way of avoiding countervailing influence.
Secondly, an examination of the first-order narrative and the attendant
analytical codes also showed that various forms of influence permeated the experience
of the board. Indeed, it became evident from these analyses that both the
understanding of influence and consideration of its use were rooted mainly in symbolic
expression. For example the influence of the CEO was manifested in an explicit
fashion via his metaphorical framing of the board's charge and his interjection in the
governance process; it was manifested implicitly in his preemptive public statements to
the bank and employees that limited the board's possible actions and co-opted them as
an influential symbol of change. Other important forms of influence emerged in the
board's awaraiess of and careful attendance to the existing power structure, expressed
in terms of a range of evocative conflict metaphors and symbols. The board's own
attempts to act as influencing agents were accomplished in several ways: by adopting
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a surrogate role aligning them with the powers-that-be; by disguising the genuine
power of the bank to allay the fears of other wary poweiholders; and by using potent
ihetorical devices as their primary means for influencing stakdiolders to accept their
recommendations and to institutionalize an orientation toward strategic change.
Taken together, the many symbols and m et^hors played a central role not only
in the board's attempt to make sense of their experience by socially constructing their
identity and purpose while dealing with external influence attempts (which
characterized the early phases), but also in their attempts to construct ways to avoid
resistance, legitimize themselves, and exert lasting influence on the thinking of other
stakeholders (which characterized the later phases). These observations suggest
another dimension to the analysis that becomes evident from the second-order level;
There were subtle, but important, transitions in the directionality of the sensemaking
and influence attempts over the interpretation, definition, legitimation, and
institutionalization phases of the board's life cycle. In the early, developmental stages,
attention was focused on what might be called internal sensemaking; in the latter
stages attention was focused on what could be called external sensemaking in that they
were trying to affect the understanding and actions of crucial external actors (a process
termed sensegiving by Gioia and Chittipeddi 1991).
The major findings of the second-order analysis are shown in Exhibit 2, which
includes the main dimensions of sensemaking and influence in terms of the guiding
symbols and m et^hors uses, as well as the directionality of these dominant processes.
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This depiction is grounded in the data in that it represents an integration of the major
fmdings presented in the preceding narrative, but takes a more theoretical perspective
on events. It portrays not only the major players in the strategic change initiation
process (top management, the board, and k^r stakeholders), but also the manner in
which sensemaking and influence evolved and were directed over the new board's first
year of existence. To this point I have treated the sensemaking and influence fmdings
as distinct, although it is evident from both the first-order narrative findings and the
second-order analysis that they
indeed converge across all stages of the board's first year of life.

Interpretations
Studies concerning deliberate strategic change typically have investigated the impact of
various demogrqihic and economic factors on different aspects of change. Although
these studies have established statistically significant relationships among key changerelated variables (e.g., senior management, structure, and effectiveness), they have not
provided fundamental descriptions or explanations about how such dramatic changes
are accomplished (Greiner and Bhambri 1989). The dynamics of the governance
process and corporate restructuring in the emerging corporation have not been well
studied. Understanding this initial period in corporate growth is a relatively new and
problematic concept.
The focus on these aspects of strategic change suggests a notably different view
of the process itself: Strategic change can be understood not only as a change in the
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position and fît of an organization in its environment, but perhaps more fundamentally
as a change in the cognitive perspective represented by a new strategy. Strategy as
cognitive perspective (Ginsberg, 1988, Mintzberg 1987) emphasizes the set of
assumptions through which the problems and issues of the organization are identified
and interpreted by top managers and key stakeholders (Hedberg and Jonsson 1978).
The alteration of this "conceptual lens" represents a fundamental shift in the
organization's belief structure, value system, and identity (Bartunek 1984, Dutton and
Dukerich 1991, Gioia and Chittipeddi 1991, Walsh 1988). Indeed, reorienting strategic
systems, structures, and commitments requires efforts to legitimize not only the new
social order represented by the change (Zucker 1987), but also how the legitimization
process itself will occur (Scott 1991).
Efforts to stabilize a social system influx from the systemic upheaval
represented by strategic change can be understood as the symbolic interplay of
sensemaking and power/ influence. These processes emerged in the attempt to
develop a consensual redefinition of social reahty on the face of an induced
discontinuity in the existing perspective of the corporation and its stakeholders. In the
process of trying to develop a strategy for instigating strategic change (a "meta
strategy") (Allaire and Firsirotu 1984), the board members had to make sense of their
situation for themselves and others, while simultaneously acting as both influenced and
influencing actors. In the midst of the uncertainty, ambiguity, and political tension
that marked these attempts, key metaphors and symbols emerged that simultaneously
heralded, represented, and facilitated the change. Indeed, symbols and metaphors
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dominated the experience of the board as it progressed through the interpretation,
definition, legitimation, and institutionalization phases of its life cycle.
Key symbols and metaphors were central to the construction of meaning and
the communication of understanding, and also acted as an impetus for influence and
action. Symbols became the primary means by which participants grounded their
perceptions and articulated their preferences concerning many aspects of strategic
change. Specifically, symbolism became the language for understanding change, while
the interplay of sensemaking and influence captured the specific actions associated
with attempts to redefine and legitimize the new social reality.
The board was the means for executing what might more accurately be termed
a reinstitutionalization process surrounding the strategic change effort,
reinstitutionalization implies an accepted reorientation in the dominant belief structure
of the organization. In the broader view, this process of attempted reinstitutionalization
involved both substantive action and expressive representation for its accomplishment.
Yet, it is clear from the findings that both action and expression took symbolic forms
at various times. Pfeffer (1981a), Edelman (1964) and others have implied that the
role of management can be divided into more-or-less separate "substantive" and
"expressive" functions. Symbolism is usually cast only as a medium of expression,
thus suggesting that the symbolic aspects of management have little to do with
instrumental action.
This study has revealed not only the pervasiveness of symbolism in the
initiation and acceptance of strategic change, but also that symbols are one of the main
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means by which management accomplishes substantive action. Thus, the two
functions ^ p e a r more symbiotically related than previous portr^als have cast them.
The instrumental aspects of management are often symbolically communicated, and
the symbolic aspects are often instrumental to action.
Symbols central to the case took several forms in addition to those already
noted. In particular two manifest forms, symbolic action and symbolic non-action,
played major roles. Actions, such as the specification of strategic business units and
target market niches, carried significant symbolism, both within the board and to
external targets of intended influence. Less obvious, but also of importance, was the
symbolically significant avoidance of certain actions, often to circumvent probable
countervailing influence by others (Dutton and Dukerich 1991). This concem with
studied non-action by the board members revealed a phenomenon that had an
anticipatory character about it: the conscious and intentional consideration of the
probable future impact of certain actions, and especially non-actions, on the meaning
construction processes of themselves and others. I have come to label this process as
"prospective sensemaking," mainly in recognition of its future-oriented focus.
Prospective sensemaking was a frequent influence on the consensual understandings
reached and decisions made by the boards. Their repeated attempts to infer the future
consequences of proposed actions as a way of understanding their present situation
moved the board members to be both proactive and prospective information seekers
(Louis 1980).
Symbols were also influential in suggesting changes in structural arrangements
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without implying loss of image or status for those affected by the change, a point
noted by Trice and Beyer (1984). The effective use of symbols is essential for
organizations that are susceptible to environmental changes. In the case of the Softalk
board, its recommendation to designate "strategic business units" was based mainly on
the need to insure organizational flexibility for change without provoking the
engineering department by signaling that their traditional power was being diluted.
This finding affirms Pondy's observation that, "In organizing, the use of metaphor
simultaneously facilitates change and reinforces traditional values" (1983: 164). In my
terms, symbols facilitate change because they simultaneously reveal and conceal
important features of change.
The often blurred distinction between sensemaking and power/ influence
processes found in this study suggests that they were interdependent and reciprocal
processes during the launching of strategic change. (Indeed, over 40% of the passages
in the transcripts that were coded as sensemaking coincided with those coded as
power/ influence). Thus, the usual conceptualization of sensemaking and
power/influence as separate processes disguises their interrelationship.
Sensemaking and power/influence, however, varied in terms of their source and
directionality over the life of the study. For example, as the board evolved from the
early to mature phases, it moved from being the conduit (Axley 1984) for sensemaking
and power/influence for key stakeholders. Overall, sensemaking and influence efforts
were directed primarily inward toward the board during the interpretation and
definition stages and mainly outward from the board during the legitimation and
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mstitutionalizatioa stages. That is, in the early stages the critical issue for the board
members was how to interpret the alternative diange processes and concepts they
confronted. Their sensemaking efforts were suscqitible to the influmce of external
actors (especially the CEO and other top managers who were perceived by board
members to be engaged in "political" behavior). Over time, they shifted to
constructing means to influence the soisemaking processes of others (Gioia and
Chittipeddi 1991, Whetten 1984).
These finding suggest that strategic change efforts instigated by new leadership
(in this case, a new CEO) might effectively begin with attempts to legitimize a
structural component of the organization to convey to stakeholders that the message
and process of change is being institutionalized. Indeed, the new board became a key
symbol of the change process. The existence, size, composition, and charge of the
board were symbolic indicators to the banking and investment community of the
commitment to strategic change (see Feldman and March 1981).
In the case of Softalk, symbolic actions were taken to disguise an intended
second-order change and make it s^pear as a less threatening first-order change
(Bartunek 1984). The affirmation of existing structures in the form of strategic
business units, while simultaneously embodying the potential for radical change, was
an instantiation of the power of symbolic action both to emphasize the comforting
features of a change while de-emphasizing the threatening features. This influencing
feature of symbols converges with Lukes' (1974) view of influence as the ability to
prevent conflict by affecting perceptions, cognition, and preferences of recalcitrant
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parties. It also constitutes a manifestation of Pfeifer's (1981b) argument that influence
is concealed in the ability to affect decision premises.
In summation, the major inferences of this study would include the following
observations: (1) Symbols are not only an expressive medium, as most existing
portrayals imply, but also a medium for substantive action. (Symbolism, therefore, not
only c^tures the thoughts and feelings of organization members, but is action- and
outcome-oriented as well); (2) Symbols are a medium for both sensemaking and
power/influence and these two

processes are inextricably intertwined.; (3)

Symbolic processes associated with the instigation of change involve evolutionary
shifts in directionality; (4) Symbolic processes simultaneously occur at multiple levels
of understanding; and finally, (5) Symbolic non-action can be important to change
initiation. (Not doing something can be as symbolic and substantive a harbinger as
overt action.)
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